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In recent years, many emerging market economies have switched or are in
the process of switching to a floating exchange rate regime. Most of these
economies have a history of high inflation and a high level of foreign
currency denominated debt. Therefore, the stability of the exchange rate
and the dynamics of its volatility are more crucial than before. This paper
analyses the dynamics of exchange rate in Turkey in the aftermath of
recent float in February 2001. The Turkish experience is a particularly
important one, and provides valuable lessons for other countries as the
Central Bank is trying to simultaneously contain the volatility of exchange
rate and pursue an implicit inflation targeting policy. The reported findings
indicate that the Central Bank policies, accompanied with favourable
external factors, were effective in taming the volatility of the exchange
rate in a relatively short period of time. However, there is a significant
real appreciation of the currency during the same period. Given the high
level of public debt and real interest rates, the current state of the economy
is very susceptible to any adverse shocks.
I. Introduction
Since the last decade of the 20th century, the emerging
market economies have been adversely affected by
the crises in the international capital markets. The
Asian crisis of 1997–1998 and the following crises in
Brazil, Russia, Turkey, and Argentina coupled with
the increased integration of capital markets around
the world have led to the question of the appropriate
exchange rate regime for an emerging economy
under free capital mobility. The policy choices, since
then, have been ‘bipolar’ in the sense that the two
extreme regimes, hard pegs and free floats, have
been favoured and the intermediate regimes have
lost their attractiveness. Although the intermediate
regimes seem to be disappearing, Fischer (2001),
Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart (2000) among
others, put forth the existence of ‘fear of floating’,
i.e., a country will not remain indifferent to wide fluc-
tuations in its exchange rate even when it has openly
committed to a float. Taylor and Sarno (2001) con-
sider whether the foreign exchange intervention is
effective, and if so the mechanisms through which
it works. Their conclusion is that intervention can
be effective even in developed markets. However, if
there is a coordination failure in intervention, it may
be hard for the officials to influence the exchange
rates.1
*Corresponding author. E-mail: pinar.ardic@boun.edu.tr
1 See Fischer (2001) for a review of exchange rate regimes around the world, and the ‘bipolar’ view. Tavlas (2003) provides a
review of exchange rate systems, emphasizing the choice of an exchange rate regime for an emerging economy. Taylor and
Sarno (2002) covers the recent literature on exchange rate economics including diverse topics such as foreign exchange market
efficiency, purchasing power parity hypothesis, exchange rate determination, monetary integration, foreign exchange market
intervention, speculative attacks, currency crises and market microstructure.
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In this context, a literature exploring the
exchange rate regime options for emerging market
economies has flourished. Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995), Mussa et al. (2000) are two examples of
the advocates against pegs, while Reinhart (2000),
and Calvo and Reinhart (2001, 2002) argue for the
peg for emerging markets.2 In addition, Cespedes
et al. (2000), Allen et al. (2002), Cavallo et al.
(2002) and Calvo et al. (2003) are among the studies
that stress the importance of exchange rate volatility
under a high degree of liability dollarization, a con-
dition which most emerging economies suffer. A high
degree of liability dollarization makes the economy
more vulnerable to external shocks by magnifying
the effects of the latter, and may trigger a crisis.
As many emerging market economies have
switched or are in the process of switching to a float-
ing exchange rate, the question of the effects of
exchange rate volatility on other macroeconomic
variables arises. Most emerging economies have a
history of high inflation and a high degree of foreign
currency denominated debt. Therefore, the stability
of the exchange rate and its volatility is crucial. This
paper analyses the dynamics of the exchange rate and
its volatility in Turkey in the aftermath the recent
float in February 2001. The Turkish experience is a
particularly important one, and provides valuable les-
sons for other countries as the Central Bank is simul-
taneously trying to contain the volatility of exchange
rate and pursue an implicit inflation targeting policy.
The present findings indicate that the Central Bank
policies, accompanied with favourable external
factors, were effective in taming the volatility of the
exchange rate in a relatively short period of time.
Estimated model parameters show that there is a
significant fall in both the unconditional mean of
the daily squared shocks to exchange rate return
and conditional volatility throughout the floating
exchange rate period. Furthermore, the distribution
of exchange rate return seems to be Normal in recent
months.
The Turkish economy has been characterized by
high levels of inflation and several stabilization
attempts since the early 1980s. At the end of
1999, the Turkish government signed a stand-by
agreement with the IMF and started to implement
another inflation stabilization programme, based on
a fixed exchange rate. The programme was unsuccess-
ful as it started with an already overvalued currency
and the overvaluation continued during the pro-
gramme. In addition to the real appreciation of
the currency, low real interest rates led to increased
imports and a high current account deficit. Excessive
risk-taking behaviour of the banking sector and
the moral hazard created by the fixed exchange rate
programme are among other factors for the failure
(Dornbusch, 2001, Eichengreen, 2001; Gençay and
Selçuk, 2005). The short-lived crisis during the pro-
gramme in November 2000, caused by an extremely
risky position of a private bank, was overcome tem-
porarily. However, adverse political developments
and the loss of confidence in the authorities triggered
another crisis in February 2001. Eventually, the
Central Bank had to abandon the fixed parity and
announced that the country moved into a floating
exchange rate regime. In several announcements,
authorities made it clear that the Central Bank
would stick to this policy.3
Following the crisis, the challenge for the Central
Bank was to re-establish confidence and contain vola-
tility in financial markets while implicitly targeting
inflation under a floating exchange rate system.
Among the factors turning this into a challenge are
a history of high inflation, no experience of a free
float and a high level of liability dollarization and
currency substitution in the economy. In a different
context, Selçuk and Ard|ç (2005) show that the
Central Bank was indeed successful in containing
exchange rate volatility. However the economy is
not free from significant risks. Particularly, the cur-
rent record level of real appreciation of the Turkish
lira, along with a possible slow down in productivity
may result in a large current account deficit. Selçuk
and Ard|ç (2005) report that this high level of appre-
ciation is not as a result of the initial overshooting in
February 2001. During the float, i.e., since March
2001, the overall real appreciation as measured by
the two real effective exchange rate indices published
by the Central Bank is in between 28 and 42% as
compared to 1995, which was a ‘normal’ year in
terms of the real exchange rate level. The current
high level of the total public debt with relatively
high real interest rates increase the fragility of the
system: the possibility of a large current account
2 Earlier literature on the choice of optimum exchange rate regime includes Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen
(1969).
3Gençay and Selçuk (2005) provide an anecdotal story of the February 2001 crisis in Turkey. For a detailed account of the
recent developments in the Turkish economy from different perspectives, see Ertuğrul and Selçuk (2002), Metin-Özcan et al.
(2001), Önis and Rubin (2003) and references therein. A series of articles in Kibritçioğlu et al. (2002) provides a detailed
analysis of inflation dynamics and disinflation efforts in Turkey. For earlier studies, see Metin (1995) and Lim and Papi
(1997). More recent studies are Celasun et al. (2003) and Domaç and Bahmani-Oskooee (2002).
































deficit and a upward correction in nominal
exchange rates lead to an increased risk premium
of the country, further worsening the fiscal position
of the government.
If the Central Bank is pursuing a free float as
stated, what might be the reason behind this high
level of appreciation? The record level of the real
appreciation may be explained in part by the produc-
tivity increase in tradeable goods sector (the so-called
‘Balassa-Samuelson effect’). Labour productivity in
private manufacturing industry increased 20%
between 2001 and 2003 (second quarter) and there
was a fall in hourly nominal wages (in USD terms)
during the same period, leading to a fall in unit wages
in USD terms. In addition, favourable external
factors that may have led to the real appreciation
of the Turkish lira need to be considered as well.
As the findings of this paper indicate, the spread
between emerging market bonds and US treasury
bills is a significant variable in explaining the nom-
inal exchange rate dynamics in Turkey (see Fig. 1).
Particularly, a decrease in this spread is usually
followed by a nominal appreciation of the Turkish
lira and vice versa. Currently, the spread is at its
historical lows and an adverse movement in this
front may trigger an increase in the nominal exchange
rate and its volatility in Turkey.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section
analyses the interaction among Central Bank’s
policies, the exchange rate return and its volatility,
and the external effects employing a VAR model.
The volatility dynamics of the exchange rate return
at different periods of float are studied in an
ARMA-GARCH framework in the third section.
Section IV concludes.
II. Central Bank Policies and
Exchange Rate
In this part, a six variable VAR system is estimated
using daily data in order to investigate the interaction
among the Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus
























Fig. 1. EMBIQ daily spread (basis point, left axis) versus TRL/USD daily exchange rate (TRL million, right axis).
Sample period: 13 March 2001 – 30 October 2003 (667 business days). Data sources: J.P. Morgan Chase and the Central
Bank of Turkey
4 The EMBI+ of J.P. Morgan Chase shows the dynamics of total returns for the external debt instruments of the emerging
market economies, including external currency-denominated Brady bonds, loans and Eurobonds, US dollar domestic instru-
ments, thus serving as a benchmark for emerging country external debt. The EMBI+ spread is the spread between emerging
market bonds and US treasury bills.
































its volatility, and the Central Bank policies. The vari-
ables in the system are the EMBIþ spread, the TRL/
USD exchange rate return (log difference, per cent),
the absolute value of the exchange rate return as
a measure of volatility (per cent), the change in the
Central Bank overnight interest rates (simple annual,
per cent), the daily total amount bought by the
Central Bank in USD buying auctions and the
amount sold by the Central Bank in USD selling
auctions (million USD). The sample period is
13 March 2001 – 30 October 2003. Officially, the
floating period started on 22 February 2001. The
first eight business days after the float have been
excluded to avoid any start-off effects in variables.
There are arguments that, since May 2003, the
Central Bank policies are targeting both the level
and direction of the exchange rate in addition to con-
taining its volatility, and the recent buying auctions
and direct buying interventions of the Central Bank
might be in response to the strong (nominal and real)
appreciation of the Turkish lira. That is, there might
be a regime change in terms of the policy conduct.
However, as documented elsewhere (Selçuk and
Ard|ç, 2005) no evidence is found for a policy change
during the mentioned period.
The VAR model for the sample period is estimated
by using a constant term and seven lags as indicated
by Sims’ Likelihood Ratio (LR) test (Sims, 1980).5
Adjusted R-squares of the estimated equations lie
between 0.03 (change in the interest rate equation)
and 0.78 (buying auctions equation). Table 1 reports
the probabilities of the F-test that the column vari-
able does not have any power in explaining the row
variable. According to the results, the Granger caus-
ality tests indicate that the EMBIþ spread causes
exchange rate return at 1% level of significance.
That is, the lagged values of EMBIþ spread are
statistically significant at 1% significance level in
exchange rate return equation while the lagged
values of exchange rate return have no explanatory
power in the EMBIþ spread equation. This finding
confirms the casual observation presented in
Fig. 1 and indicates that the exchange rate dynamics
in Turkey are sensitive to the international interest
rate differential between developed and developing
economies. Among other variables, exchange rate
return causes volatility, and selling auction of the
Central Bank causes the EMBIþ spread at 1%.
Notice that causality tests are conducted to deter-
mine which variable in an estimated system
comes first. Therefore, this finding should be inter-
preted with caution. According to the result of the
causality tests, feedback is observed among exchange
rate return and selling auctions, and changes in the
interest rate and exchange rate volatility at 5% and
1% significance levels respectively.
Figure 2 plots the response of exchange rate
return to shocks to different variables in the system,
along with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. The
response of exchange rate return to a positive shock
in the EMBIþ spread (11 percentage points increase)
is positive and significant after 1 day (0.2% increase).
A significant negative response is observed after
six days but the magnitude of this negative response
is smaller than the positive one (0.11% decrease).
Overall, it can be concluded that the exchange rate
depreciates as a response to an unexpected increase
in the EMBIþ spread.
It is possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the
Central Bank’s policies on the exchange rate return
by looking at the impulse response of the exchange
rate return to one standard deviation shock to the
change in interest rate, buying auctions and selling
auctions. Normally, it would be expected that
positive shocks to buying auctions would have a
positive impact on the exchange rate, i.e., a deprecia-
tion. Figure 2 indicates that initial return response
to one standard deviation shock to buying auction
(21 million USD increase), however, is negative
(appreciation) (0.1% decrease) and becomes positive
Table 1. Granger causality probabilities. Sample period: 13 March 2001 – 30 October 2003 (667 business days). The rows show
equations. The reported probabilities are probabilities that the column variable does not Granger cause the row variable
EMBI+ Return Volatility Int. rate But auction Sell auction
EMBIþ 0.00 0.39 0.78 0.62 0.78 0.00
Return 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.65 0.30 0.00
Volatility 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.00
Interest rate 0.57 0.14 0.00 0.84 0.09 0.42
Buying auction 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.27 0.00 1.00
Selling auction 0.58 0.03 0.11 0.17 0.95 0.00
5 The full estimation results in this section are not reported in order to save space. They are available from the authors
upon request.
































only after two periods. Overall response, therefore,
is close to zero. On the other hand, a shock to
selling auctions (30 million USD increase) results
in a negative response from the exchange rate return,
as expected. But the response reverses itself and
becomes positive after four periods (0.03%, 0.2%,
0.06% and 0.08% declines are followed by increases
of 0.13% and 0.15%). The overall response is, again,
close to zero. The response of the exchange rate
return to a positive shock in the overnight
interest rate change (60 basis points increase) is
negative after one day (0.1% decrease), followed by
subsequent positive and negative impacts which offset
one another and eventually die out in eight days.
In sum, the exchange rate responses to the
Central Bank policy instruments show that the
Bank did not influence the exchange rate return
during the float.
In several announcements, the policymakers made
it clear that the exchange rate volatility would be a
concern for the Central Bank. The response of
exchange rate volatility to shocks to different vari-
ables in the system is plotted in Fig. 3. The response
of exchange rate volatility to a positive shock to the
EMBIþ spread (11 percentage points increase) is not
significant first, and becomes significantly positive
after five days (0.06% and 0.09% increases). That
is, an unexpected increase in the EMBIþ spread
increases the exchange rate volatility. Given the sym-
metric nature of the impulse responses, we may infer
that an unexpected decrease in the spread is followed












































(d) Response to Interest Rate Change







(e) Response to Auction (Buy)
Days






(f) Response to Auction (Sell)
Days
Fig. 2. TRL/USD daily exchange rate return (log difference) response to shocks to different variables in the system. (a) Response
to a shock (11.05% increase) in EMBIþ Spread. (b) Response to a shock (1.36% increase) in TRL/USD daily exchange rate
return. (c) Response to a shock (1.06% increase) in TRL/USD daily volatility (absolute return). (d) Response to a shock (0.60%
increase) in change in overnight interest rates. (e) Response to a shock (21 Million USD increase) in Central Bank USD buying
auction. (f) Response to a shock (30 Million USD increase) in Central Bank selling auction. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals
are plotted as straight lines. Sample period: 13 March 2001 – 30 October 2003 (667 business days)
































(see Fig. 1) is probably one of the positive factors
in containing the exchange rate volatility in Turkey.
Concerning the Central Bank policies, the response
of volatility to shocks to buying and selling
auctions and shocks to indicative interest rate may
be evaluated. Among these, the volatility response
to selling auction shocks (30 million USD increase)
is the most noticeable. The response is statistically
significant and negative for five days (0.04%
decrease after one day followed by subsequent
declines ranging between 0.15% and 0.2%) indicating
that the selling auction was effective in containing the
volatility. Similarly, interest rate cuts were effective
in reducing the exchange rate volatility: an unex-
pected cut in the overnight interest rates of
60 basis points leads to a decline in the volatility
of the exchange rate by 0.05% one day after
and 0.1% two days after. A shock to buying auction,
on the other hand, does not have any significant
effect: the central bank was simply accumulating
its foreign exchange reserves through buying
auctions without affecting the exchange rate return
or its volatility.
The findings in this part indicate that the Central
Bank was effective in taming the exchange rate
volatility without influencing the exchange rate
return. In this process, a favourable external factor
(the recent falling spread between emerging market
bonds and US treasury bills) seems to be a crucial
factor which signals that any adverse development
in this front would make the Central Banks’ job










































(d) Response to Interest Rate Change







(e) Response to Auction (Buy)
Days






(f) Response to Auction (Sell)
Days
Fig. 3. TRL/USD daily exchange rate volatility response to shocks to different variables in the system. (a) Response to a shock
(11.05% increase) in EMBIQ Spread. (b) Response to a shock (1.36% increase) in TRL/USD daily exchange rate return.
(c) Response to a shock (1.06% increase) in TRL/USD daily volatility (absolute return). (d) Response to a shock (0.60%
increase) in change in overnight interest rates. (e) Response to a shock (21 Million USD increase) in Central Bank USD buying
auction. (f) Response to a shock (30 Million USD increase) in Central Bank selling auction. 95% bootstrap confidence intervals
are plotted as straight lines. Sample period: 13 March 2001 – 30 October 2003 (667 business days)
































III. Volatility Dynamics of the
Exchange Rate
In the aftermath of the float, the volatility of the
foreign exchange rate return was extremely large
for the first few months. This high volatility period
was followed by a relatively low volatility for about
18 months. After the first quarter of 2003 until the
end of the sample period, the TRL/USD exchange
rate return has experienced a period of relative tran-
quility. In this part, the volatility dynamics of the
exchange rate during the full sample are analysed,
as well as three subsamples, defined as the first 160
days (13 March 2001 – 25 October 2001), the follow-
ing 378 days (26 October 2001 – 30 April 2003) and
the last 129 days (1 May 2003 – 30 October 2003).
Table 2 gives the summary statistics for the daily
exchange rate return series over the sample period,
13 March 2001 – 30 October 2003, and three sub-
samples. The mean and the standard deviation of
the daily return series for the full sample are 0.07%
(20% annual compound) and 1.36% however, that
the behaviour of the exchange rate return is different
across subsamples. During the first 160 days of
the float, the series has higher mean and volatility.
In the second subsample, which runs through
26 October 2001 – 30 April 2003, exchange rate
return shows lower volatility and has a lower
mean than the initial period. The daily mean return
is positive (0.34%, 141.7% annual compound) in the
initial period, and becomes negative in the subse-
quent periods: 0.01% (2.6% annual compound),
and 0.04% (9.9% annual compound). The stan-
dard deviation of the return series has also declined
from a high of 2.30% in the initial period to a low of
0.70% in the final period. For the first two subsam-
ples, the return series display excess kurtosis and
positive skewness. However, for the final period
these values are not statistically significant to imply
a deviation from normality.
The unit root tests on the foreign exchange rate
series show no evidence of a unit root. Using the
Box–Jenkins approach, the best fitting model for
the TRL/USD exchange rate return series is found
to be an ARMA(2,1).6 The squared residuals of
the ARMA(2,1) model displays serial correlation
suggestive of an ARCH-type process. After some
preliminary investigation, it was decided to estimate
the following ARMA(2,1)-GARCH(1,1) for the full
sample and three subsamples7:
rt ¼ a0 þ a1rt1 þ a2rt2 þ b1t1 þ t,





where t ¼ tt and t is a white noise process with
2 ¼ 1. Notice that the parameter 1 in Equation 1
shows the extent to which a volatility shock today
feeds through into next period’s volatility while
ð1 þ 1Þ measures the rate at which this effect dies
out over time (Campbell et al., 1997, p. 483).
In other words, 1 indicates the level of persistency
in ‘volatility of volatility.’ Therefore, a decrease in
this parameter may be interpreted as a strong indica-
tion of containing the volatility. Regarding ð1 þ 1Þ,
a useful measure is known as ‘half-life’ (hl ) which





For example, given ð1 þ 1Þ ¼ 0:90, it would take
approximately seven days after a shock to halve
its impact while ð1 þ 1Þ ¼ 0:80 implies that half
life is only three days, provided that there are no
6The results of the unit root tests and ARMA(p,q) modeling are not fully reported. These are available from the authors
upon request.
7 A GARCH-M (GARCH in mean) model was also estimated for all samples to see whether the exchange rate return
depends on its volatility or not. The risk premium parameter in the return equation was not significant.
Table 2. Exchange rate return series: summary statistics (daily, in %). Subsamples: the first 160 days: 13 March 2001 – 25









Mean 0.07 0.34 0.01 0.04
Standard deviation 1.36 2.30 0.92 0.70
Excess Kurtosis 12.14 4.16 1.63 0.10
Skewness 1.27 0.69 0.70 0.36
Maximum 10.05 10.05 3.51 1.79
Minimum 8.36 8.36 2.19 2.03
Sample size (days) 667 160 378 129
































other shocks. Also notice that the unconditional
mean of 2t is given by
Eð2t Þ ¼
c
1 ð1 þ 1Þ
provided that ð1 þ 1Þ < 1.
Estimation results are presented in Table 3 for
the full sample and three subsamples. In order to
check the robustness of the results, the model was
estimated with normally distributed, Student’s t
distributed and with generalized error distribution
(GED) residuals. According to the parameters of
the ARMA model, the unconditional mean of the
daily exchange rate return is estimated as 0.32 for
the first period, 0.005 for the second period, and
0.027 for the last period. Notice that these values
are very close to the sample statistics (see Table 2).
Likelihood values (not reported) and standard
errors of the parameters indicate that GED model
performs best for the first period and Student’s t
and the GED models perform better than the
Table 3. The estimation results of ARMA(2,1)-GARCH(1,1) model with the Normal (N), Student’s t (t) and the GED residuals.
The model is estimated for the whole sample as well as three subsamples: the first 160 days (13 March 2001 – 25 October 2001),
the following 378 days (26 October 2001 – 30 April 2003) and the last 129 days (1 May 2003 – 30 October 2003). Standard errors
are in parentheses. See the text for an explanation of hl (half-life) and the unconditional means of the squared shocks, Eð2t Þ, and
the daily exchange rate return, E(rt)
Full sample 1st 160 days 161st May 2003 May 2003–Oct 2003
ARMA(2,1)
Constant 0.0651 0.3096 0.0066 0.0401
(0.0550) (0.1755) (0.0614) (0.0862)
â1 0.0881 0.1883 0.2083 0.3710
(0.1608) (0.1614) (0.2376) (0.2130)
â2 0.1523 0.2112 0.0677 0.0847
(0.0689) (0.0966) (0.0625) (0.0860)
b̂1 0.0076 0.1268 0.3358 0.4331
(0.2257) (0.2408) (0.2350) (0.2060)
EðrtÞ (%) 0.061 0.32 0.005 0.027
GARCH(1,1) (N)
Constant 0.0363 3.6303 0.0875 0.0595
(0.0168) (3.7655) (0.0369) (0.0300)
̂1 0.1804 1.0000 0.3494 0.1184
(0.0430) (3.8359) (0.1346) (0.0659)
̂1 0.8135 0.0000 0.5936 0.7593
(0.0261) (0.2024) (0.0830) (0.0237)
hl (days) 115 n.a. 11.8 5.3
Eð2t Þ (%) 5.9 n.a. 1.53 0.49
GARCH(1,1) (t)
Constant 0.0860 2.4815 0.0749 0.0568
(0.0342) (6.8262) (0.0294) (0.0319)
̂1 0.2784 0.7139 0.2724 0.1216
(0.0802) (1.9623) (0.0898) (0.0680)
̂1 0.6949 0.0552 0.6646 0.7638
(0.0572) (0.1363) (0.0550) (0.0236)
df 5.02 3.1 8 30
hl (days) 25.6 2.6 10.6 5.7
Eð2t Þ (%) 3.22 10.74 1.18 0.49
GARCH(1,1) (GED)
Constant 0.0567 2.0713 0.0817 0.0577
(0.0214) (0.6200) (0.0336) (0.0308)
̂1 0.2159 0.5472 0.2902 0.1211
(0.0572) (0.2596) (0.1020) (0.0673)
̂1 0.7640 0.0339 0.6422 0.7622
(0.0397) (0.0736) (0.0650) (0.0230)
 1.21 1.1 1.39 1.81
hl (days) 34 1.3 9.9 5.8
Eð2t Þ (%) 2.82 4.94 1.21 0.49
































Normal for the second period. For the third sub-
period, there is not much difference among all three
models. The estimated degrees of freedom of
Student’s t distribution (df) for all three subperiods
also indicates that the Normal distribution assump-
tion is inadequate, especially for the first two periods.
The estimated df is 3.1 and 8 for the first two sub-
samples while it is 30 for the last period. Similarly,
the parameter  which governs the thickness of the
tails in the GED model is estimated as 1.1 and 1.39
for the first and the second subperiod, respectively.
For the last period, it is 1.81. Notice that  ¼ 2 for
the Normal distribution. If  < 2 the GED density
has thicker tails than the Normal, whereas for  > 2
it has thinner tails. Based on these estimated param-
eters, it is safe to conclude that the exchange rate
return has a Normal distribution after May 2003.
According to estimated parameters, there is a
significant fall in the volatility of volatility from
the beginning towards the end of the floating period.
Estimated 1 in Equation 1 is around 0.71 (Student’s t)
and 0.55 (GED) during the first period which shows
that volatility shocks were persistent at the beginning
of the float. The same parameter is 0.12 (all three
models) for the last period, indicating that volatility
shock feeds into future volatility significantly less than
before. This finding shows that the Central Bank
policies, as well as favorable external factors, caused
a significant reduction in the persistence of volatility.
In other words, the spillover effect of the shocks to
the volatility has been contained successfully.
Estimated half-life figures in Table 3 also show
that it takes a short period of time after a shock to
halve its impact in recent months. During the second
period, estimated half-life is around ten days (GED)
and 11 days (Student’s t). The same figure is around
five days (Normal) and six days (Student’s t and
GED) during the last period. According to estimated
parameters, there is also a significant fall in the
unconditional mean of the daily squared shocks,
Eð2t Þ, during the sample period. It was around 4.9
(GED) and 10.7 (Student’s t) percent at the beginning
of the float while it is less than 0.5% in the third
period according to all models.
Figure 4 plots estimated daily conditional vola-
tility series for the full sample and three subsamples.

































Fig. 4. Estimated conditional volatility (Student’s t distribution with different degrees of freedom). The model is estimated
for (a) the whole sample, (b) the first 160 days (13 March 2001 – 25 October 2001), (c) the following 378 days (26 October
2001 – 30 April 2003) and (d) the last 129 days (1 May 2003 – 30 October 2003). See Table 3 for details
































There is a significant fall in conditional volatility ser-
ies throughout the sample period. At the beginning of
the float, the conditional volatility fluctuates around
10% with occasional large jumps as high as 60%.
During the last period, the same figure is fluctuating
around 0.5% and never reaches over 1%.
IV. Conclusion
This paper analyses the recent floating exchange rate
regime experience of Turkey in light of the Central
Bank policies. The findings indicate that the Central
Bank policies, accompanied with favourable external
factors, were effective in taming the volatility of the
exchange rate in a relatively short period of time.
Estimated model parameters show that there is a
significant fall in both the unconditional mean of
the daily squared shocks to exchange rate return
and conditional volatility throughout the floating
exchange rate period. Furthermore, the distribution
of exchange rate return seems to be the Normal in
recent months. In this process, a favourable external
factor (the recent falling spread between emerging
market bonds and US treasury bills) seems to
be a crucial factor which signals that any adverse
development in this front would make the Central
Banks’ job more difficult than before. It remains
to be investigated whether the spread between
emerging market bonds and US treasury bills is a
significant variable in explaining the exchange
rate dynamics in other emerging market economies
with a floating exchange rate regime. This is left
for future research.
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